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On the other hand, however, the growing interactions berween sta te 
institutions and the women's movement within a strategy of devolution of 
state powers raise sorne concerns that take a peculiar coloration in the ltalian 
case. In particular, the risks of a cooptation of the Third Sector, as well as of 
a decrease in the quality of public services, are increased by the characteris­
tics of the ltalian welfare state as well as the peculiar control by the parties 
over the civic societies. In Italy, in fact, a tradition of a particularistic and 
clientelistic welfare sta te, with the protection of "strong" social actors and 
the clientelistic mediation of political parties, meant the abandonment of the 
poor to the charity intervention of Third Sector organizations. The weakness 
of the bureaucracy faced with the strength of the political parties pushed the 
movement to look for political interlocutors inside the administration. Re­
lationships based on "clientela" and "parentela" developed with so-called 
"finanziamenti a pioggia" (raindrops sponsorship) where financial assistance 
was given to ideologically proximate associations with no control extended 
by the state on the use of this money. The legacy of this tradition is still 
visible, even if there is an evolution toward a sponsorship linked to the offer 
of services and public controls on the associations' budgets and functioning. 
Under these circumstances, downloading and offioading may strongly reduce 
the quality of public services, increasing the dependence of civil society upon 
those actors who control, within a clientelistic tradition, public financing. As 
for the women's movement, the adaptation to the changes in state strategies 
provides new resources for various activities, but at the risk of taming the 
movement's potential for disruption and innovation. The "Latin" tradition 
of direct action and revolutionary ideology seems to weaken when faced 
with increasing cooperative interaction with the restructured sta te, espe­
cially at the local level, where a long history of overlapping membership 
with left-wing patties and trade unions eased the interaction berween the 
women's movement and the local administration. Insofar as the restructur­
ing of the state involves a worsening of a welfare model, already particularly 
unsympathetic to women's demands, the traditional mistrust of the women's 
movement toward state institutions may yet prevail. 
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In August 1998 the press declared that the Spanish Socialist Party (Partido 
Socialista Obrero Español, PSOE), the main opposition party, would submit 
a bill to reform the electorallaw. The hypothetical bill, for that is what it was, 
would have required all electoral lists to limit their candidates of the same 
sex to no more than 60%. In effect, this was a proposal for a quota of 40% 
for women. The second largest opposition party, the United Left (Izquierda 
Unida, lu, ideologically to the left of the PSOE) supported the idea, but 
the governing conservative party, the People's Party (Partido Popular, PP) 
strongly opposed it. Such a bill did not pass. Indeed it was never presented 
to parliament, being considered too risky by leading socialists (E{País, A ugust 
31,1998; December 27,1998). 
Yet, as the lists prepared for the local, regional, and European elections of 
June 1999 showed, despite the lack of any legally enforced quotas, the num­
ber of women on the lists of the major parties was higher than ever before. 
Indeed both the conservative PP and the Socialist Party placed a woman in 
the number one position on the list for the European elections. In addition, in 
the national elections of 2000,29% of those elected to the lower house were 
women as were 24% of those elected to the Sena te, while the speakers of 
both houses are women. Therefore, according to one French observer, parity 
is "Iived in reality," and the debates which have shaken France for a decade 
about increasing the number of women in elected office, as well as its legis­
lation, has "provoked smiles" if not criticisms (Le Monde, March 8, 2001). 
France does provide a contrasting story to this one of relatively steady 
increase in the number of women holding e1ected office and senior positions 
in government.ln 1998, nine of every ten deputies in the National Assembly 
were still male. Dominated by the political right, in early 1999 the Senate re­
jected a bill to enable affirmative action in politics that had already been over­
whelmingly approved by the National Assembly. It finally accepted it only 
under heavy political pressure and threat. On June 6, 2000, France reformed 
the Constitution of the Fifth Republic, enshrining a legal protection of actions 
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to achieve equal access of women and men ro e1ected office (Article 3)' Since 
then, two sets of e1ections have been held. In March 2001 local e1ections 
increased the percentage of women holding municipal office dramatically 
from 22% to 48%. However, only 7% took the mayor's office. Moreover, 
in the e1ections for governments of cantons (held at the same time and with 
single-member constituencies), the number of female candidates rose to 20% 
(from 15 % in 1998), but the number e1ected increased only by 1.5 percentage 
points, to reach 10% (Le Monde, April 22-23, 2001: 6). In September 2001 
a first wave of elections to the Senate was held according to the new elec­
toral law. Opposition from senators and machinations by them meant that 
rhe number of female senators rose only from twenty tO twenty eight in the 
upper chamber which has 321 members (Le Monde, September 21, 2001). 
Both these patterns of change were, at least in part, the result of the types 
of c1aims made by mobilized networks seeking to change the status of women 
within their respective countries.ln the case of France, these activists proudly 
benr the name of parity movement (mouvement pour la parité) and describe 
it as a grass-roots movement (Bataille and Gaspard 1999: 32ff). In contrast, 
for the Spanish case it is we who are naming the loose grouping of feminist 
activists in left-wing political parties and women's groups mobilized in favor 
of higher representation of women in state structures the "democratic-parity 
movement" or "parity movement." Nonetheless, both fit the analytic def­
inition of a women's movement used in this book (see Chapter 1), that is, 
their definition, content, development, orissues are specific to women and 
their gender identity. As such, they revive c1aims advanced by the suffragists 
of the first-wave women's movement and rhe actions of the second-wave to 
feminize polirical institutions. 
The decision to pursue a strategy of reform of the French Constitution 
was not available to Spanish feminists.ln 1996, after fourteen years of social­
ist government, the conserva tive People's Party (PP) too k over the national 
government. This successful alternation in power demonstrated (just as it 
had in France in 1981 when the first left-wing president took office in the Fifth 
Republic) that consritutional issues of the transition were settled.' However, 
issues of institutional, especially constitutional, change remain difficult in 
Spain because of the conflicrs with Basque nationalists. At this point in time, 
institutions remain hostage to that issue. No change in the constitution is 
politically feasible until the issue is settled and therefore most parity activists 
in Spain do not dare to call for constitutional reformo 
But this is only one reason for the differences between the two movements; 
orhers are important too. Therefore, this chapter examines and compares 
There. were, for example, serious discussions in the press throughout the 1970S about whether 
there wouJd be a hand over of power from right 10 lefr, if the candidate of the United Lefr 
were to win an e1ection. As Jate as 1981 a certain sigh of relief occurred as Valéry Giscard 
d'Estaing moved out of the Elysée leaving ir 10 Fran~ois. Mitterrand; republican instirurions 
had held. 
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rhese movements in the following ways. First, ir describes the reconfiguration 
of the French and Spanish sta tes and asks what effects these changes might 
have for social movement politics. Second, ir examines in more detail the 
actions of these two parity movements, seeking to account for the different 
strategies and outcomes in the two cases. 
RECONFIGUREO STATES ANO MOVEMENT ACTION 
Despite what might appear at first glance to be large differences between 
rhe two cases, France and Spain share experiences on several dimensions of 
reconfiguration of their state institutions, with respect to structural changes 
within the sta te, discourses about the role of the sta te, and changing relation­
ships between the state and civil society (see Chapter 1). We can expect each 
aspect of reconfigurarion to have consequences for the type of mobilization 
that the two women's movements undertake, alrhough as the next section 
makes c1ear, there are also factors in civil society that help to account for 
differences between French and Spanish women's c1aims. 
Wirh respect to structural changes, both sta tes are committed to rhe 
project of building Europe, although for slightly different reasons. In the 
case of Spain, wirh its history of Francoism and its more fragile democratic 
institutions, as well as its economic problems, rhe European Community (and 
then Union) was perceived, borh from Madrid and in Brussels, as a buttress 
for the democratizarion process. After the death of Franco in 1975 all polit­
ical forces, with much popular support, promoted c10ser ties with European 
institutions. Therefore, the governments of socialisr Felipe González (elected 
in 1982) actively participated in the development of a European dime n­
sion to their actions and politics, with Spain joining the European Com­
munity in 1986. In France, by 1983 the choice of accepting the European 
monetary regime over any more autarkic solurion was made, and in sub­
sequent years, first under rhe presidency of Franc,:ois Mitterrand and then 
that of Jacques Chirac, the srate was deliberarely opened to the influence of 
European institutions. 
These commitments provoked a shift in the instirutions of political repre­
sentation. Ir beca me legitima te for citizens, including those who were active 
in social movements, to seek representation in European institutions and 
recognition from them. Politics had beco me multilevel (Liebfried and Pierson 
1995).' These commitments also brought a change in the very definition of 
what it meant to be French or Spanish. National identities became more 
pluralist, more varied, while social rights were realigned. 
In addition, in both countries there has been a change in the political dis­
course about the role of the state, one which blurs distinctions between left 
2 This chaprer does nor address the other way in which politics was becoming multilevel, with 
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and right and that has consequences for public policy and service delivery. 
Both Spain and France have moved away, on the left as well as the right, from 
the social traditions of the Keynesian welfare sta te. In part the shift results 
from the convergence criteria imposed by the European Monetary System, 
but there have also been, within the domestic politics of each country, forces 
for neoliberalism, including of a left-wing variety, which would reduce state 
spending, redirect activities from direct provision to public financing of pri­
vately provided services, and seek partnerships with the associations of civil 
society (Letablier 1996). 
In France, Fran~ois Mitterrand made an historic choice in 1983 ro move 
the economic policy of the socialist governments toward a broad center 
republican tradition and away from the more left-wing vision of republican­
ism that placed the goal of reducing inequalities - both social and sexual ­
front and center (Jenson and Sineau 1995: ch. 5). The goal according to the 
president and his supporters within the Socialist Party and elsewhere was ro 
"modernize" France by reconfiguring the role of the state and its relationship 
with civil society. The change in ideological discourses and policy preferences 
as well as the institutions of the Fifth Republic have led ro a weakening of 
party ti es, as the party system itse!f dissolves in the face of institutional re­
inforcement of presidentialism and the notion that Iittle separa tes the social 
policies of the right from those of the left. 
Bringing about such a shift required altering the principIes of the political 
discourses which had underpinned state actions. In the first three post-1945 
decades in France, for example, the distinction between social c1asses and 
between left and right provided the basis for social and political difference.3 
In the 1980s this link began ro disintegrate. While France did not commit 
itself to the hardy neoliberalism of Reaganism or Thatcherism, equality of 
opportunity began to replace equality of results as a central goal (Gélédan 
1993). France had succumbed to neoliberalism's enthusiasm for competitive 
individualism.4 
Child-care services, care for the dependent elderly, and policies for the 
economically marginal still capture a relatively high leve! of public funding, 
) Elecroral politicsof me Fifth Republic became bifurcated. After I958 the Communists were 
readmitted ro the status of legitimate party and the centrist Christian Democracy folded its 
rento Most other forms of politics beyond elections also turned on c1ass distinctions. · For 
example, throughout the postwar period, associations representing any category of the popu· 
lation were aligned with a political family and often with a political party. The latter was 
the case of the Union des Femmes Fr<11lfilises, a f1anking organization of the Communist Party. 
But there were also parent-teacher associations divided by political family, teachers and pro­
fessors unions, hunting and fishing associations, and so on. French citizens' political identity 
depended on their positíon on the left-right spectrum. Such alignment continues in Spain and 
is described below. 
4 The goal of achieving equality gave way in these years ro scruggle againscexclusion. Rather 
chan seeking ro equalize, the idea was simply to make sure no one fell out of society. 
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but services are being provided outside of public institutions, in the vol­
untary sector or the social economy. This makesthe third sector, nonprofits, 
and voluntary associations important actors (Jenson 1998; Joe! and Martin 1998). 
Broad differences in political discourse stilI separate right and left in Spain. 
Nonetheless, differences between the major Spanish political families on eco­
nomic and social policy have also narrowed. Both support monetary rigor 
and controlIing the deficit. The Socialist Party continues to present itself ro 
the elecrorate as the party most concerned with the maintenance and expan­
sion of the welfare state, rather than abandoning its commitment to social 
rights. GeneralIy speaking, however, the Conservative Party also tries to look 
like a center rather than a right-wing party, and so the PP promises not to 
destroy the welfare state. Ir has signed social pacts with unions regarding 
this issue. 
Nonetheless, downloading is also occurring in Spain. The conserva ti ve 
government is proposing that people are better cared for by the family and 
community than by the state. Indeed, the state's financing of services via 
subsidies for delivery by groups in civil society has resulted in one of the 
major areas of growth in the women's movement in the 1990S, that is direct 
provision of services. Whereas in the 1970S such actions were often a form of 
civil disobedience, with the redesign of social services in the 1990S, women's 
groups are now involved in front line delivery of state-funded services (see 
Valiente this book). 
Discourses of left and right on class and gender power stilI distinguish 
Spain's two political families, then. Parties in the left speak about econornic 
inequalities more often than the Conservative Party, with the latter partic­
ularly stressing opportunities for people to participa te in the labor market, 
make a living, take ca re of themselves, and be able not to depend on the wel­
fare state. Indeed, the notion of "opportunities" is crucial to the PP, which 
entitled one of the main documents presented to its 1999 Congress, "In 
favour of a Spain full of opportunities" (Por Úl España de las Oportunidades). 
There are two potential consequences of such reconfiguration of the state 
for social movement mobilizations. One is that as the relationship between 
state and civil society is altered by governments, the social rights of citi­
zenship lose legitimacy and responsibility is assigned to the family or the 
community as civil and political rights gain importance. The definition of 
citizenship may even be narrowed such that it comes to mean only the right 
to civil and political rights. In such a universe of political discourse, move­
ments still committed to a social agenda and to achieving the social rights of 
citizenship may find the going heavy, while those whose focus is primarily 
on civil and political rights may find that their way is smoother. Second, 
as public services are hollowed out, and provision of services becomes less 
transparent, social movements may have to adjust their mobilization strate­
gies. The state and its agencies have a less direct - or at least seemingly less 
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direct - involvement in creating solidarity and social equality. The private 
sector, whether commercial or nonprofit, appears to have a larger role. The 
result is a chalIenge to the repertoire of social movements that have tradí­
tionalIy mobilized to face the sta te and make c1aim to the sta te. FinalIy, as 
multilevel politics become the norm, patterns of mobilization and interest 
intermediation wilI alter. 
These observations of the patterns of reconfiguration in sta tes, their insti­
tutions, and their practices lead to three alterations in patterns of mobiliza­
tion of women's movements, and more particularly, the parity movements. 
1. 	 The structural change to upload responsibilities to the EU wilI make 
mobilization increasingly multilevel, involving the quasi-state institu­
tions of the Union. 
2. 	 The greater the shift in political discourse away from its grounding in 
c1ass analysis, the greater Iikelihood of crosspartisan or nonpartisan 
mobilization. 
3. 	 The more the principIes of postwar, and in the case of Spain post-1975, 
politics are altered, the greater wilI be the downplaying of c1aims in the 
name of social rights and a rising emphasis on civil and political rights. 
Those wings of the women's movements that still include a social rights 
agenda wilI find themselves in greater difficulty than those that make 
c1aims primarily in the name of civil and political rights. 
The next two sections of the chapter demonstrate the extent to which 
the two movements analyzed he re folIow these patterns. To anticipate the 
conclusion, we wilI find that the French movement conforms more to these 
patterns than does the Spanish one. 
LE MOUVEMENTPOUR LA PARlTÉ IN FRANCE-A STAR ASCENDING 
Despite the fact that we now associate the notion of the movement for parity 
with the widespread mobilization which has marked French electoral and 
social movement politics and to a lesser extent those of Spain, the first ca lis 
for parity were actually organized by the European Community. As early as 
1990, the idea of gender parity in decision-making institutions was being 
advanced in Brussels, and in November 1992 the first European Summit 
of Women and Decision-Making was held in Athens. A number of French 
women, from both the right and the left, were actively involved in the summit. 
For example Simone Veil (a member of a center-right party and former presi­
dent of the European Parliament) and Edith Cresson (former Socialist Prime 
Minister of France) were the official French representatives, while Yvette 
Roudy, Fran<;oise Gaspard, and Elisabeth Guigou (alI socialists) were active 
participants. 
The statement of principIe signed and named the Athens Declaration as­
serted: "a democratic system must assure equal participation by its citizens 
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in public and politicallife.. : . Women represent half the population. Equality 
requires parity in the representation and administration of countries." 
The summit that produced the declaratíon was organized by the European 
Network of Women in Decision-Making, which was created and funded 
by the Equal Opportunities Unit of the European Commission. The lat­
ter had, in íts Third Action Plan in 1990, identified the absence of women 
in decision-making positions as a major blockage to the achievement of 
the equal opportunities guaranteed by Article 119 of the 1957 Treaty of 
Rome. 
At its creation in 1990 the European Network was charged with studying 
the social and political mechanisms which generate inequality and to colIect 
precise statistical data about women's participation in aH domains of deci­
sion making. In other words, the task was to provide detailed analysis and 
to propose concrete actions so that equality could be achieved. While the at­
tention given to gender equality was not new, either for the European Union 
or for second-wave feminism, there was a slightly different twist. The call 
was for absolute equality and for mechanisms guaranteed to achieve it. 
By the time of the Athens Summit, mobilization was increasing in France. 
From the beginning, the c1aim was framed in terms of citizenship. For 
example, in 199 2 Fran<;oise Gaspard, Claude Servan-Schreiber, and Anne 
Le Gall published Au pouvoir citoyennes: Liberté, Egalité, Parité.5 In 1993, 
fourteen existing women's associations representing elected women, Catholic 
women, and the center-right, among others, formed Elles-aussi. Described as 
dedicated to achieving parity, it would conduct a national campaign to mo­
bilize, support, and prepare women to become candidates in upcoming e1ec­
tions (re Mbndli,-january 16; 1993). Simultaneously, Yvette Roudy created 
the Assemblée des femmes, as a group within the Socialist Party (Parti social­
iste, PSi· Despite being an internal body, the group was open from the begin­
ning to interested women who were not members of the party. Academics 
were included in this category. Among the members of the support commit­
tee was Elisabeth Guigou, ministre dé/éguée for European issues. Through­
out 1993, colIoquia were held, including at the National Assembly and the 
Senate on March 8, and one at UNESCO organized by Gisele Halimi's group, 
Choisir la cause des femmes. The first public demonstration, in front of the 
National Assembly, also took place in April of that year. Another public event 
was the publication in the national newspaper, Le Monde, of the Manifesto of 
577 persons forparity. The group was composed of 289 women and 288 men, 
drawn widely from the political spectrum. Gender parity in electoral insri­
tutions was described as being as basic to democracy as the separation of 
powers and universal suffrage (Le Monde, November 10, 1993). 
l.A number of press anides also appeared in 1992 explaining rhe electoral su<;éesses _ such 
as rhey were - of rhe French Greens (Verts) by rheir commirmenr ro running lisrs wirh equal
numbers of women and meno . 
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The basic claim advanced in aH these events was the same: There must be 
an equal number of women and men in electoral institutions. 6 The reasons for 
caHing for parity were not always the same, however. As early as 1993 there 
were a variety of arguments in circulation. One is a republican one, which is 
perhaps the best known beca use of being promoted by Fran¡;:oise Gaspard, 
one of the most visible activists for parity. Ir inscribes gender parity in the 
tradition of the movement for suffrage and identifies the absence of women 
in politics as a national humiliation. A second part of this argument is that 
the justification for gender parity is simple: There would be no humanity 
if there were not two different sexes. Women and men together define and 
perpetuate the species. Therefore, they must together, and equally, organize 
social life, not beca use of any sexual essentialism but beca use they jointly 
form the human race. This formulation called for a reformulation of the 
republican triplet. A true democracy should be based on the real, not false, 
political equality of aH its children, translated into a revised and corrected 
republican symbolism: liberry, equality, and parity (Le Monde, February 19, 
1993)· 
While they sought the same reform, and therefore also mobilized for gen­
der parity in the institutions, other women, especially those coming from the 
right of the political spectrum, tended to justify it differently. For example, 
at the UNESCO meeting in June 1993, Simone Veil said, "1 believe that men 
and women are rich in their differences and that they are complementary. 
Ir is, moreover, in the name of these differences and of all that women can 
offer that it is necessary to demand equality in politics."? 
Many proponents of parity explicitly reject the notion of quotas, prefer­
ring instead topromote simple equality, offering several reasons for being 
wary of them. Probably the most important was the rejection of an earlier 
quota by the Constitutional Council. In 1982, the socialist government, with 
the unanimous support of the National Assembly, had proposed a quota of 
25 % for the lists in municipal elections. In effect, the law would have lim­
ited all lists to a maximum of 75% of candidates of the same sex. 8 This 
timid effort to impose a quota was immediately found unconstitutional by 
the Constitutional Council, which declared on November 18, 1982 that the 
law contravened both Section 3 of the Constitution of the Fifeh Republic 
and Article 6 of the Declaration of the Rights of Man and the Citizen. In 
essence, the argument was that a 25% quota, in the name of affirmative 
action, interfered with the equality of all citizens before the law, guaranteed 
For a summary of the arguments, in English, see Gaspard (I998b). 
7 As the joumalist Chtistiane Chombeau remarked, "a few years ago, Madame Veil's views 
would have provoked protesrs in a meering of women. Instead, thunderous applause greeted 
this c1aim ro a right ro equality in difference» (Le Monde, June 6-7, I993). 
Do not be fooled by rhe unanirnous vote. Mosr legislarors were confident the Conseil consti· 
turionel would overtum the law. 
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by these two sections of the constitution. 9 In order to get around the judg­
ment against quotas and affirmative action, activists promoted simple equal­
ity, that is parity in the number of women and men (Mossuz-Lavau 1998: 
ch. 2). 
A second reason for preferring parity to quotas was that the word was 
familiar from existing discourse about representation. While parity itself 
was a very familiar concept, being used as a basic principie for a variety of 
employer-employee institutions, use of the term by the European Network 
and French activists was novel in two ways. It had never before been applied 
to the composition of electoral institutions and it had not been used to 
describe the distribution in terms of sexo 
The call for a reform of electoral institutions to institute gender parity was 
quickly linked to broader debates and discursive shifes about the role of the 
state, one of the elements of reconfiguration of the French sta te. As the goal 
of equality of outcome for income distribution gave way to the more liberal 
search for equality of opportunity, issues of access and fairness carne to the 
fore. Everyone should have her or his chance, but the market (including the 
political market) would decide the result. Thus, the parity movement with 
its focus on access and gender equality but its indifference to whether the 
women elected were right wing or lefe wing, rich or poor, and so on, fit well 
with this notion of equality. 
Secondly, structural changes within the sta te, especially those associated 
with the move to Europeanization, economic reforms, cutbacks, and so on, 
generated dissent. One of the political spaces in which this dissent was first 
expressed was in a public debate about the so-called crisis of representa­
. tlon that provbked a goód deal of controversy 'in the winter of 199 2-3 . By 
December 1992, the notion was gaining ground that the political world was 
closed, elites had lost touch and were making decisions that did not reflect 
their constituents' views, that many were corrupt, and that they clung to 
outmoded distinctions such as lefe and right. The time had come, according 
to the interveners in this debate, to move away from old practices. In this 
controversy, the Greens, whose positions blurred the usualleft-right distinc­
tions, were frequently presented as examples of aH that might be good. lO 
The consensus that ultimately emerged from the debate was that it was 
necessary to replace the old and tired party hacks with a new generation and 
that the political institutions should be reformed to make them more open 
9 	 Someconstitutional experrs now wonder whether the Conseil constitutionel would have been 

able ro come ro the same conclusion after I984, when France signed the UN Declaration on 

the Elimination of Gender Discrimination. Ir pennits affirmarive action as a remporary step 

ro pro mote gender equality (Sineau I997a : I24, n6). 
10 	This descriprion is derived from an analysis of the texts pubJished in Le Monde in 
December I99 2 and January I993· The Verrs' prodaimed position was thar they were "ni, 
ni" (neirher right nor leh). 
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and less likely to be taken over by a small and isolated elite. For example, 
the holding of multiple offices, which permitted a single person to hold sev­
eral elected positions simultaneously (for instance, mayor, deputy, regional 
councillor, Euro-parliamentarian) carne in for criticismo 
The groups and associations promoting parity that were created in 1992 
and 1993 picked up and e1aborated precisely such themes. The crisis of 
representation, in which elected officials were too distant from citizens and 
there was a need for a new kind of politics, was frequently the point of 
departure for their c1aims. Instituting parity would auromatically bring a 
significant renewal of political personnel; the National Assembly in 1993 
still was 94 % male. The old and tired could be replaced and new politics 
could begin. For example, prominent socialist and femin ist Yvette Roudy 
justified founding the Assemblée des femmes by the fact that political parties' 
misogyny - reflectedin their failure ro nomina te women - cut them off from 
their political base. 
As early as 1993, the parity movement exhibited the pattern we have 
identified as a response to the reconfiguration of the French state. Ir was 
heavily influenced by its ties to the European-Ievel Network. The Summit 
of Athens provided a catalyst ro organizing activities in France. The con­
stant back and forth of activists who were active in the European Network 
meant that funds flowed to French groups, and French political women were 
among the leaders of the network. Secondly, actions crossed party Iines. Ini­
tially, it is true that the official groupings tended to reflect the left-right 
split. The Assemblée des femmes arose in the PS while Elles-aussi was linked 
to the center-right. Nonetheless, the boundaries were always blurry. The 
Assemblée des femmes welcomed individual feminists whowere not social- ' 
isrs. Moreover, borh Simone Veil and Edirh Cresson represented France in 
Athens. Even more telling was the ease with which rhe earliest demonstra­
tions were organized and crossed party lines. March 8, 1993 was marked by 
a meeting at the Sena te, organized by Yvette Roudy, bur including twenty-five 
women's groups from both left and right, and by a round table at the Narional 
Assembly organized by the grouping Reseau femmes pour la parité, again a 
transpartisan groUp." In contrast, the feminisrs active in the popular sector 
(lemouvement social) marshalled only a dozen associations to protest the issue 
of abortion (Le Monde, March 7-8, 1993)' Parity was not on their agenda. 
These characteristics of the movement intensified over rhe next years. 
Actions at the European level continued, French women were involved, 
and these mobilizations helped legitimate the actions of French groups. For 
example, on May 18, 1996, thirteen women ministers from the fifteen mem­
ber sta tes of the European Union signed what has come ro be known as the 
lJ This nerwork included several women's groups, including ¡he Assemblée des femmes, me 
women 's comminee of rhe Verrs, the Conseil national des femmes fran~aises (irself composed 
of 120 associarions), Elles-aussi, and so on (Le Monde, April 6, 1993). 
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Charter of Rome. They had been invited by the president of rhe European 
Council to a summit on Women and the Renewal of Politics and Society. 
While their signa tu re on rhe Charter did not officially commit rheir govern­
ments, it nonetheless did address a strong statement ro the Intergovernmental 
Conference (IGe) which was about ro embark on preparing modificarions of 
the Maastricht Treary. The Charter identified the principal responsibility of 
the IGC ro be the reinforcement of democracy. In thatcontext, these ministers 
claimed that democracy requires giving priority to actions with the potential 
to genera te equal participation and a partnership between women and men. 
Moreover, only with such equal participation will citizens have confidence in 
rheir political institutions. In other words, for those who signed the Charter, 
the next step in the building of European institutions _ via the eliminarion 
of the democratic deficit - required a radically increased presence of women 
in all decision-making institurions. 
Increasingly, the na me CLEF (Coordination pour le lobby européen 
des femmes) appeared at the head of actions for parity. This grouping of 
sixty associations was funded (as were similar groups in the other member 
sta tes) by the EU. CLEF joined, for example, in signing the Open Letter to 
President Chirac in March 1996 that called on him ro live up to his electoral 
promises on parity (Le Monde, March 8, 1996). Another example: CLEF 
was also in the Network Woman, Man, Parity (Réseau Femme et Homme, 
la parité) that was formed in November 1998 ro assure legislative passage 
and implementation of a reformo 
The fiftieth anniversary of female suffrage (April 21, 1944) provided 

an excellent 9cqsion for_.:Il1oqiljzation . .and several actions were launched. 

By 1995, however, the best known of the parity activists were seeking to 

broaden their popular base. They began to name themselves the parity 

movement. They undertook signature campaigns. They promoted common 

strategies and joint actions. New networks formed. For example, Demain 

la pariré [Tomorrow ParityJ was established in 1995 at the instigation of 

Frans:oise Gaspard, who suggested that the largest associations and feder­

ations of French women's associations coalesce around a common strategy 
(Servan-Schreiber 1997: 37). The eight affiliated associations or federations 
of this network are Action catholique générale féminine (ACGF), Associa­
tion fran\=aise des femmes diplómées des universités (AFFDU), Coordination 
frans:aise pour le lobby européen des femmes (CLEF), Elles-aussi, Organ­
isation internarionale des femmes sionistes (WIZO), Parité-Infos, Un ion 
féminine civique et sociale (UFCS), and Union professionnelle féminíne (UPF) 
(Massé 1996: 4)· By 1997, an inventory identified seventy-two associations 
of all kinds working for parity, forty of which worked almosr exclusively 
on it (Assises nationales 1998: 196). Again, the mobilization and affiliarions 
crossed partisan Iines and polirical families. Indeed, in June 1996, ten female 
ex-minisrers from governments of rhe right and the left published a Manifesro 
for Parity in L'Express (Sineau I997a: 120,3). Again the notion rhat women 
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and men brought different qualities to politics and that their skills should be 
respected appeared in rhis manifesto. 
Politicians responded and elecrions beca me important moments for debat­
ing and clarifying positions, as well as mobilizing. The legislative elections 
in the spring of 1993 had been a major disappointment; indeed sorne at­
tributed the surge of mobilization, including the creation of the Assemblée 
des femmes, to the frustration of that experience. '2 From the beginning of 
the movement, the overwhelming maleness of the National Assembly and 
Senate had been described as a French - shameful- exception, a red lantern 
in the world. Comparisons with other countries (sometimes somewhat dis­
missive of them) were common. For example, in her overview for the 1993 
elections, journalist Christine Leclerc wrote: "[Although al macho country 
and an emerging democracy, Spain has three times more elected women" (Le 
Monde, February 19, 1993). 
Change did occur, however. In the 1994 Europarliamentary elections, the 
socialist Miche! Rocard ran a list which was - almost - half female and 
half male. 13 Indeed fully six lists looked as if they were following a parity 
model. In the 1995 presidential e!ections, under pressure from the parity 
movement, the candidates were compelled ro reveal their positions. '4 The 
communist candidate called for a referendum, the Green for constitutional 
reform, Lione! Jospin (PS) proposed an Estates-General of women to discuss 
the matter, while Jacques Chirac called on the parties ro encourage female 
candidates. Édouard Balladur, who had forgotten ro put the matter in 
his platform, announced on the 8th of March that he supported minimal 
quotas for municipal and regional elections. 
Followingthe election of J acques Chirat in May, the Prime Minister Alain 
Juppé appointed the most feminized cabinet in French history, at 29%. By 
November of the same year, he had dismissed eight of the thirreen, provok­
ing an outcry throughout the ranks of women politicians and many parity 
activists. Such unanimity arose directly from the stance of the movement. 
While there might be differences in the philosophical grounding of various 
tendencies, as described previously, there was very little talk of the poficy 
content that might follow from electing more women. Moreover, beca use 
of the nonpartisanship clearly implanted in the movement, women from the 
left as well as the right found it logical to defend the Juppettes, as the women 
fired from the cabinet were sometimes termed. 
u The rate of e1ection of women in 1993 was: 17% Communist; 15% ecologisrs; 8% PS; and 
7% UPE (Le Monde, February 18, 1993). 
1) There was a notorious break of the order exactly at the point where the cut-off was expected 
ro be, thereby favoring male candidates. Such alrernation was a novelty only for the Socialists; 
the Verts always had such a Iist. 
14 An all-candidate meeting was organized by the Conseil national des femmes fran~aises on 
April 7· 
France and Spain 
Consideration of policy Content could not be complete!y avoided, how­
ever. The parity activists and the movement itself stumbled for a moment in 
the faH of 1995. At that time, in response to a caH from the CADAC (Coor­
dination pour le Droit aI'avortement et ala contraception), 40,000 women 
and men, many in family groupings, joined the demonstration in Paris on 
November 25 in defense of the right to abortion and contraception. While 
access to abortion had been deteriorating over the years, due in part to the vi­
olent actions of the pro-life forces, the precipitating factor creating this large 
turnout and the support of unions, parties, and women's groups was the leg­
islation produced by an RPR deputy, Christine Boutin. Ir was hard, in this 
case, to defend the principie that policy content was not the issue when di s­
cussing representation. The problem intensified as the Front National took 
to nominating women. Nonetheless, activists continued to refuse ro enter 
what they saw as a trap. For example, they used rhe following argument to 
explain their principies to those scandalized by the National Front's substi­
tution of Cathérine Mégret, self-acknowledged as having no qualifications 
for the position, as mayor when her husband was relieved of his duties by 
the courts: 
Sur in mixing togerher everyrhing, and using rhe argumenr rhar a "good" male can­
didare is preferable ro a "bad" female candidare, one is quire simply undermining 
rhe basic idea of pariry. The claim of pariry, we should remember, is based on rhe 
self-evidenr assumption rhar rhere musr be as many women as men in public life, 
from aH rhe polirical parries rhar participare in elecrions. (Servan-Schreiber 1997: 5) 
It was finally in 1997 that the situationjJegan to change) on two fronts. 
Two years earlier the PS hacl ánno~-nced that3 00/0 of its c~ndidates in the next 
e!ection would be female and it would reserve winnable seats for promising 
candidates (Praud 1998). Its closest competitors took note and when no m­
inations closed, 27% of communist candidates were women, while 28 % 
of those of the Greens and the PS were female. The Right did not follow, 
although 12% of the National Front candidates were women (Le Monde, 
May 23, 1997)· The final results were not as high, of course. Only 17% of 
socialist deputies were female, but women's presencerose from four to forry­
two. The overall average doubled, reaching 11 %. Despite this multiplication, 
only Greece in the EU had a lower percentage. 
The second change carne with respect ro the main demand of the parity 
movement - that is, for legal action. The government of Lionel Jospin, with 
the grudging acceptance of President Chirac, decided to propose a consti­
tutional amendment. This had been the recommendation of, inter afia, the 
Observatoire de la parité, named by Prime Minister Juppé after the Right won 
the 1995 e!ections and reporting in January 1996. The consultative body 
was headed by Gisele Halimi, who had in earlier elections stood for the 
PS, and Roselyne Bachelot, a supporter of the RPR (Rassemblement pour 
la République, Jacques Chirac's political formation). The original proposal 
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would have located the constitutionallegitimacy of actions ro achieve parity 
in Artide 34 of the constitution. This would have meant it applied ro a wide 
range of circumstances and might have become a constitutional pillar for af­
firmative action. After long debates, the cabinet decided ro change Artide 3, 
thereby limiting the constitutional permission to elections (Le Monde, 
December 19, 1998). This more limited law was voted by the National 
Assembly, rejected by the Senate and then finally passed in June 2.000. 
The debate leading up to the various votes provoked conflict, ro be sure. 

From opponents carne calls for everything from instituting quotas rather than 

changing the constitution, to reforming the elecrorallaw tO doing nothing at 

all. This is not the place to review that debate (among others, for a summary, 

see Sineau 1997a and Mossuz-Lavau 1998: chs. 3-4)· More interesting for 

our purposes is the conflict within the movement for parity about how ro 

achieve it. Immediately after the report of the Observatoire, for example, 

Évelyne Pisier called for a process of nominations which would introduce 

parity into other political positions than simply elected ones (Le Monde, 

March II, 1997)' For her part, Fran~oise Gaspard carne out against the idea 

of a constitutional amendment, preferring a regular law. She saw the idea 
of constitutional change as an easy way for male politicians ro gain time, as 
well as to do «damage control" (Gaspard 199 8a). 
An even more interesting conflict was that about a feminist agenda. After 
1995 and the mobilization ro defend the abortion law (loi Veil) and the erup­
tion of pro test throughout France in December, which eventually carne ro 
be termed le mouvement social, a coa litio n began to prepare for the National 
Assizes on Women's Rights, held in 1996 and 1997· Organized in a series of 
meetings around the country, they in volved mobilization of i66 associations, 
the five main union federations, and seven left-wing political parties, all of 
whom participated in the preparation of these meetings in the provinces and 
Paris. Given this composition, it is obvious that the Assizes did not reach very 
far into the center of the political spectrum; it remained anchored on the left. 
Discussion focused on five issues - abortion, violence against women, 
family policy, work, and politics. However, as the press coverage and the fi­
nal report both testify, it was only the last twO that really received sustained 
attention.15 In other words, the issues on the feminist agenda were reduced 
to these twO. The focus on work is hardly surprising, given both the com­
position of the organizing collectives and the job situation in France, with 
its unemployment rates hovering around 12.% and that of young women 
substantially higher. 
15 	 For example, rhe final report of rhe Narional Assizes published none of rhe preliminary 
srudies collected from experts in rhe fields of family, reproductive righrs, or violence, while 
including several in rhe domains of work and politics. The secrion of rhe report dealing wirh 
polirics began, as well, wirh a sraremem abour divergences wirhin rhe movemem abour rhe 
advisabiliry of legislarive change (Assises nationales 1998: 175, 183ff) 
France arul Spain 
What is somewhat more surprising is the extent ro which the parity move­
ment had come to be seen as the visible face of the women's movement. 
Overshadowed were issues that had given rise to the women's movement, in 
the case of abortion, or sustained it through the thin years of the 1980s, in the 
case of violence against women. 16 Ir is, of course, not the case that all such iss­
ues have been ignored. A campaign in favor of contraception and protection 
of the supplies of the abortion pill (RU-486) was announced on March 8, 
1998, and Prime Minister Jospin eventually got around to appointing an 
official responsible for women's rights. Fully six months after the election, 
Genevieve Fraisse, a researcher in philosophy, was named interdepartmental 
delegate (déléguée interministérielle), one of the most minor posts in French 
public administration. Women's difficulties in the job market ha ve been dis­
cussed in the press (Le Monde, November 5, 1997) and the 1997 March for 
Women's Work received sorne attention. 
Nevertheless, none of this competes either in public attention or policy 
action with the more favored parity movement. Ir is the social movement 
that pro mises ro address the institutional crisis by relegitimating political 
institutions, that gladly accepts the Europeanization of politics, and that 
attaches no policy conditions, and certainly no social policy conditions, to 
its daims. Ir fits well within the neoliberalism of the reconfigured French 
state. 
MOBILIZATION FOR BETfER REPRESENTATION OF WOMEN IN SPAIN 
The actions we are calling the parity-democracy fJ1--ºvem.ent are 001 self­
named as such, as we have already said. This is one crucial variation among 
several that distinguishes these two cases. Despite these differences, however, 
it is helpful to examine the Spanish story for what it tells us about the ques­
tions at hand and particularly our expectations about state reconfiguration 
on social movements. Our argument is that the ways that state reconfigura­
tion has occurred in Spain, while similar in many ways ro what happened in 
France, were tempered by continuing differences between the two political 
families of left and right. One result is that the movements have not followed 
the same patterns. 
Before moving to that analysis, we will dispose of one hypothesis. This is 
that the existence and polítical activity of the groups pressing for the election 
of more women is due ro "need." While France remained at the bottom of 
the pack in Europe throughout the 1990S, Spain's location was better. The 
presence of women in political decision making has been increasing in Spain 
in the twenty years of democracy and has reached the middle of the EU 
listo In 1995, one in four (2.4 %) representatives in the lower chamber were 
16 	 Family policy, as many orher public policies, had never been an importam concern of rhe 
French women's movemem. 
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women and the increase continued even when the conservatives were elected 
in 1996 and 2000. 17 Such a continuous increase of women in high-ranked 
political positions might have, then, weakened the argument that new 
strategies (especialIy mandatory quotas for alI elecrorallists) would have to 
be tried in order to increase the proportion of female politicians. Opponents 
can always argue that in sorne years or decades the number of women 
politicians wilI be equal to those of men, if things continue ro work in the 
usual way. The pariry-democracy movement, however, seeks faster change. 
In part, however, the increase in numbers is due ro the quotas estab­
lished by parties of the lefe in the 1980s. These, in turn, were the result 
of mobilizing within parties of the lefe and the unionseven before 1975. 
Women in the Communist Party (Partido Comunista de España, PCE, later 
included in the electoral coalition of Izquierda Unida, IU) and in the trade 
union formerly close ro it, the Workers' Commissions (Comisiones Obreras, 
CCOO), managed ro form women's committees at the highest possible orga­
nizationallevel since the beginning. In contrast, women in the Socialist Party 
(Partido Socialista Obero Español, PSOE) and the union formerly close to 
it, the General Workers' Union (Unión General de Trabajadores, UGT) ini­
tially formed women's units with a lower profile (Threlfall 1996: II9, 138). 
Feminists were active within the PSOE at least since the beginning of the 
transition to democracy and sought organizational status within the party. 
In 1976, a women's caucus (a kind of study group) calIed Women and So­
cialism (Mujer y Socialismo) was foemed. In 198I, one of its members was 
elected to the PSOE executivecommittee, and others followed. In December 
I984 the women's caucus was raised to the status of a women's secretariat 
at the fecleFal executive level (Threlfall!985)' 
The lefe-wing parties established internal quotas. The IU was consistently 
the third largest party in e1ections (except in two national elections). It was 
created by the merger of the Communist Party and other parties to the lefe 
of the Socialists, and since I986 has had a commitment ro gender equiry 
and a quota for women in its statutes (El País, August 3I, 1998). The PSOE, 
which governed Spain from I982 until 1996, also established a 25% quota 
for women in I988. 
Without taking a stand on the claim that change will happen automat­
ically, it seems reasonable ro assume that more than "need" was in play. 
Moreover, several French parties, including the Socialists, have had quotas 
for many years, without much effect (Praud I988). Quotas are not sufficient, 
then, to account for French-Spanish differences. Moreover, Spanish feminists 
themselves are mobilizing for newstrategies and it is their expressed interest 
which convinces us that more is going on and more attention is needed. 
17 This proportion is aboye rhose of Belgium, France, Greece, Ireland, Iraly, Luxembourg, 
Porrugal, and rhe Unired Kingdom, and is very c10se ro rhose of Germany and Austria, 
alrhough below rhe Nordic countries and rhe Netherlands (Uriarre and Elizondo 1997: 338). 
France and Spain 
As indicated in the opening paragraph of this chapter, in August 1998 
it appeared that the socialists would present a bilI to reform the electoral 
law, thereby instituting a compulsory quota for alI parties. This expecta­
tion was the product of the on-going efforts of the parity-democracy move­
ment, a very loose set of feminist activists in lefe-wing political parties and 
in women's groups mobilized in favor of better representation of women in 
state structures. Although the announcement was premature, and the bill 
was nor forthcoming, the history leading up to it does reveal the story of the 
democratic-pariry movement. 
Issues of representation have preoccupied Spanish feminists for many 
years. The first democratic elections in four decades, in June 1977, raised 
expectations among many advocates of women's rights (Durán and Gallego 
1986: 208-209). Therefore, on July 13, 1977, at the first meeting of the 
Congress of Deputies, women's rights activists presented their manifesto in 
support of the twenry-five women elected to parliament, denounced the fact 
that there were so few elected, and asked the three feminist MPs to push the 
feminist agenda in Congress (Escario et al., 1996: 270-272). Through these 
years, however, the women's movement, albeit weaker than in sorne coun­
tries, pursued an ambitious agenda that went far beyond issues of women's 
presence in politics. In the 1970S and through the 19 80s, among the goals 
pursued were equality before the law, reproductive rights such as decrimi­
nalization of the selling and advertising of contraceptives (achieved in I 978), 
a divorce law (obtained in 1981), legalization of abortion, lB criminalization 
of sexual violence, and equal employment policies. Because in the I970S the 
expansion of the welfare state was stilI seen as a feasible goal by many sOCial 
- and politkal actors, feminists also concentrated on pressing for social rights 
which would benefit women. 
Since then, as many of the most pressing legal changes (divorce, contra­

ception, violence) had been achieved and as the goals for and spending on 

social policy have been scaled back, the issue of representation has taken 

up more of the agenda. Moreover, beca use the Spanish women's movement 

in general has involved women within parties, it is not surprising that they 

have come to focus on matters of access to elected office, both within their 

parties and more generalIy. 
The current Spanish democratic-parity movement consists of feminist 
leaders and activists in political parties and in women's organizations, 
18 	 Aborrion was illegal in Spain until passage of rhe 1985 "organic law." Abortion is now 

permirred under three circumstances: when the woman has been raped, when the pregnancy 

seriously endangers the woman's life, and when rhe ferus has malformations. An organic law 

(Ley orgánica) regulares, among other marrers, fundamental rights and public liberties. An 

absolute majoriry of the Lower Chamber, in a final vote of the whole projecr, is necessary for 

approval, modification, or derogation of an organic law. For an ordinary law only a simple 

majoriry is required. . 
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primarily from the left. '9 It includes feminists from the Socialist Party and 
left-wing political parties ro the left of the PSOE, such as the United Lefe 
(Izquierda Unida, IU) and the New Left (Nueva Izquierda, NI).20 As for 
women's associations, the parity movement rose out of well-known women's 
groups mainly linked to political parties, including (among others): the 
Federation of Progressive Women (Federación de Mujeres Progresistas), 
close to the Socialist Party, and the Dolores Ibárruri Foundation (Fundación 
Dolores Ibárruri), close to the United Left. Other much less known feminist 
groups, that rarely receive mass media attention, such as the Forum of Fem­
inist Politics (Forum de Política Feminista), are also mobilized in favor of 
parity democracy. 
The conservative PP and women's associations close to it are not mobi­
lized around the issue of political representation, even if their numbers in 
elected office have also been increasing since the PP won the elections of 
1996 and 2000. As with many other conservative parties (although not, as 
we have seen, those in France), women from these parties think that it is 
wrong to intervene in the recruitment process in order to elect more women. 
For instance, Amalia Gómez, General Secretariat of Social Affairs in the first 
PP government, dismissed such efforts as "the wonderbra quota" (la cuota 
del wonderbra) (El País May 18, 1997). Her more restrained colleagues term 
quotas a form of discrimination (see Isabel Tocino, PP Minister of the En­
vironment in Mujeres 1994, (13) 22-23). Others claim that only their party 
gives women real opportunities to gain the centers of power, in contrast ro 
the artificial quotas of the PSOE (El País February 19, 1999). 
Conservative women argue instead that the process must be "fair" and 
"neutral," so that the "best people"-(includingwomen) can be elected. Sorne 
may accept "soft" measures (such as encouraging women to stand for of­
fice) but oppose "hard" ones (such as quotas). Therefore, the srory of the 
'9 	The sources for this case study mainly consist of: 1) in-depth semistructured interviews with 
women leaders and acrivists of political parties and of women's organizations conducted 
by Celia Valiente in April and May 1999; 2.) press artides from El País (the main narional 
newspaper) and Mujeres (the publication of the Women's Instirute, the main institution at the 
central state leve! in charge of improving women 's status); and 3) published and unpublished 
documents of political parties and women 's organizations. Personal interviews and press 
files are more important sources for the Spanish case than for the French for three reasons. 
First, there are hardly any academic sources on the ropic . Second, press articles are the 
only published material. Third, local, regional, and European elections will be held in Spain 
in June 1999. At the time of interviewing (April 1999), political parties were e1aborating 
electorallists (in Spain there are c10sed lists). It was especially important to trace the fight 
for parity democracy at the moment of making the lists. This could only be done with the 
help of press articles and personahnterviews. 
20 	This movement is feminist, in the sense that its members c1aim to be so. This is especially im­
portant in Spain, where the term (eminist is usually employed in a derogatory way. Therefore, 
many people who believe in the goals of feminism refuse tO use the word (eminism to describe 
their beliefs and practices. Yet in this case, the rerm is used. 
France and Spain 
democratic-parity movement in Spain is one that tilts to the lefe, and this is 
a difference between it and the French movement, characterized by cross­
partisanship from the beginning. 
Important in Spain, just as in France, is a group formerly called the Spanish 
Association to Support the European Women's Lobby (Asociación Española 
de Apoyo al Lobby Europeo), and now named the Spanish Coordination 
for the European Women's Lobby (Coordinadora Española para el Lobby 
Europeo de Mujeres) . This umbrella organization active in national and EU 
politics has close ties with the Socialist Party and is the sister organization 
ro France's CLEF. 
As the presence of this latter group suggests, multilevel politics has been 
important to the Spanish story for a decade. International arenas, especially 
the EU and the UN World Conference ofBeijing (1995), were used by Spanish 
feminists to promote their agenda of equal gender representation in politics. 
Supranational organizations served as public forums where activists could 
express demands as well as act as a source of ideas and material resources 
supporting development of parity demands in domestic politics. Indeed, in­
formants report that even Spanish women from the PP, the conservative party, 
have become more favorable to the idea of increasing the number of women 
in political decision-making positions after having attended European-Ievel 
meetings, where they observed conservative colleagues from other member 
states promoting that goal (Paloma Saavedra, interview). 
The first Spanish moves in favor of parity in the 1990S had a clear 
European and international dimensiono On September 22, 1990, the 

European_Women's Lobby was , c;re¡lted, with CLEf from France and a 

Spanish group soon- jolning. The European lobby includes Europe-wide 

women's organizations as well as women's umbrella organizations from each 

EU member-state. The purpose of this lobby is to promote women's interests 

at the level of the EU (Hoskyns 1996: 185-186). The Spanish Association to 

Support the European Women's Lobby was founded in March 1993. Ir is an 

umbrella body of women's groups funded mainly with European money. It 

quickly began to promote parity; in 1994, the Spanish association presented 

a motion to the General Assembly of the European Women's Lobby in favor 
of it (Mujeres 1994: (13) 23-24). 
Spaniards have also been active within the institutions of the EU and 
through them the UN. In 1994 and 1995, preparation of the Beijing Con­
ference included many events, all of which usually had at least one session 
related to the topic of equal representation of women and men in politics. 
These activities were organized, among others, by the Spanish state, the 
European Union, the UN Committee on the Elimination of Discrimination 
Against Women, and Spanish women's associations from civil society. The 
Spanish sta te, through its Ministry of Social Affairs, was very active in the 
preparation of the Beijing Conference, beca use Spain held the presidency of 
the EU in the second half of 1995 when the conference took place. The Beijing 
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platform of September 1995 described access to political office as crucial for 
women's well-being and encouraged sta tes to make the necessary provisions 
for thefulfilment of the aim, induding a reform in electoral law (El País, 
November 2, 1998). In addition, the Fourth EU Action Program on Equal 
Opportunities (1996-2000) was approved in December 1995, when the EU 
presidency was held by Spain. One of the main objectives of this action plan 
was the equal participation of women and men in decision making in al! 
fields. 
Mobilization also occurred within Spain. For instance, in October 1997 a 
European congress of political management by women (Congreso Europeo 
sobre Gestión Política de las Mujeres) was organized in Bilbao by the feminist 
group Lambroa (Colectivo Feminista Lambroa) to create a women's list for 
the European elections of June 1999. Female politicians from the parties 
to the left of the PSOE and regionalist parties were invited to recount their 
political experiences (El País, October 27, 1997). There have also been studies 
commissioned on the topic of women in decision-making positions, such as 
the research undertaken by the Dolores Ibárruri Foundation (1998) on the 
locallevel. The results were presented in a seminar attended mainly by local 
politicians from all political parties. 
During the campaigns leading up to the elections of June 1999, activists 
energetically iniriated public debates on the issue of women's access to polit­
ical decision making. However, the proposal to change the electorallaw in 
order to make quotas mandatory for all political parties is under considera­
rion not only in feminist cirdes (as it is usual!y the case with gender matters 
in Spain) but also in the general political arenas. 
Just as we saw in France, when the debate abounhe crisis "of represen­
tation broke out and involved male as wel! as female politicians, several 
people who usual!y do not participate in debates on gender equality have 
made significant interventions on the topic. Such is the case, among others, 
of Gregorio Peces Barba, former president of the Congress of Deputies (a 
member of the PSOE) and currently president of the Universidad Carlos III 
de Madrid, and Alfonso Ruiz-Miguel, professor of philosophy of law at the 
Universidad Autónoma de Madrid. Both men have published artides, the 
first in El País, the country's major newspaper, and the second in Claves de 
Razón Práctica, a leading joumal of opinion (Peces-Barba 1999; Ruiz-Miguel 
1999). Both artides support parity activists' cal! ro amend the electorallaw 
and develop the daim that such a reform is constitutional. 
In addition, in May 1999 the Spanish Coordinationfor the European 
Women's Lobby (Coordinadora Española para el Lobby Europeo de 
Mujeres, CELEM) organized an international conference on the topic 
induding politicians and scholars from EU member sta tes and the European 
institutions. Parity activists in Spain are fully aware oE the danger of Spain 
finding itself in the same situation as France or Italy, whose constitu­
tional courts have already dedared quotas unconstitutional. Moreover, as 
France and Spain 
previously mentioned, activIsts are not cal!ing for constitutional reform 
beca use of the link to the Basque issue. Despite these examples of cross-party 
activities, however, a major distinction between the French and Spanish 
actions in favor of parity is that the Iberian actions almost completely 
respect the left-right divide. Moreover, while women's organizations from 
civil society play a not negligible role, it remains a secondary one. The 
initiative has belonged to the Socialist Party. 
In general, aH individual activists and groups that fight for parity democ­
racy see themselves on the left. The core of the movement is formed by 
feminist leaders and activists from the Socialist Party and women's associ­
ations in civil society but dose to the PSOE (Elena Valenciano, interview). 
The parity movement has been unable - and is probably unwil!ing - to at­
tract members from the right. The conservative party in govemment and 
Women for Democracy (Mujeres para la Democracia), the main women's 
association very dose to the PP, never speak of "parity democracy." They 
strongly oppose any attempt to make equal representation of women and 
men mandatory for aH political parties and in all state institutions. Indeed, 
most right-wing parties reject even voluntary quotas. 
Even more reflective of the continuing importance of traditionalleft-right 
splits in Spain is the fact that there are divisions within the left, just as the 
French (and most other movements) were divided in the 1970S and 1980s. 
There are groups and activists across the broad left promoting parity democ­
racy, but they do not do so together with PSOE activists. The separation of 
parity activists who belong or are dose to different left-wing parties is not 
total, of course. Sorne rather limited joint actions have been undertaken. 
The most common way such a jomt aétion" hap"pens is that a group orga­
nizes an event and invites representatives from the other parts of the left. For 
instance, when PSOE activists organize a debate on parity democracy, they 
wil! usuaHy invite a speaker from the United Left and perhaps someone from 
the New Left. Perhaps only one non-PSOE person wíl! be invited. Moreover, 
such invitations rarely go to right-wing parity activists. As a result, individ­
ual events dearly belong to each party or group; they are not nonpartisan 
(Pilar Folguera, interview). 
Keeping the debate within the bounds of traditional discourse helps to 
explain the life story of parity in Spain. Ir also, as we will see, shapes the re­
configuration of the sta te, where the discourse about the role of the state and 
the relationship between state and civil society still distinguishes between the 
two major political familíes of left and ríght. Most movemen"t has been in 
the direction of quotas, rather than parity, and these quotas have been estab­
lished by the parties themselves. After the defeat of the PSOE government 
in the I996 general elections, the party's General Secretariat for Women's 
Participatíon (Secretaría de Participación de la Mujer) and the femínist lobby 
within the PSOE took up the parity democracy issue and provoked a debate. 
At the Thirty-fourth PSOE Federal Congress (June 20-22, I997) a resolution 
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passed limiting the presence of candidates of a single sex to no more than 
60% in internal party positions and on electoral Iists. This was, in other 
words, an increase of the party's quota from 25% to 40%. 
The process of increasing the number of party positions held by women 
seems to have happened in allleft-wing parties (Pilar Arias, Patrocinio de 
las Heras, and Caridad García, interviews). Indeed, the parity agenda is 
now being instituted by the newest party on the left. The New Left (Nueva 
Izquierda, NI) originated from a split of the United Left. Its first congress 
in I998 set up a governing structure in which 50% of aH decision-making 
positions were occupied by women. 
The actual implementation of quotas for candidates has proven more dif­
ficult, however. Indeed, getting the PSOE to respect its own commitment to 
parity has not been easy. For example, in the regional e1ections of Galicia 
(December I997) and the Basque region (October I998), the PSOE lists were 
only 20% and 33 % female respectively (El País, January 3I, I999). Parity 
activists in the PSOE mobilized in the spring I999 to avoid a repetition of 
this failure torespect the party's position. Key to this action was the fact 
that two parity activists were members not only of the PSOE executive com­
mittee but also of the party committee in charge of the approval of electoral 
lists: Micaela Navarro (Secretary for Women's Participation) and Carmen 
Martínez-Ten (a former director of the Women's Institute). The"approval of 
electoral parity lists was controversial, involving as it did rejection of sorne 
electoral lists prepared by PSOE leaders for their electoral districts. The 
committee defined parity lists as those containing at least 40% of women in 
winning positions!I EventuaHy, however, almost all PSOE lists fulfilled the 
40% quota (Micaela Navarro, interview). " 
There is also another aspect of internal politics that has led feminists to 
intensify their call for parity and therefore compulsory quotas. The PSOE has 
a primary system, since I997, used to designate the candidate for prime mi n­
ister and to select candidates to other posts including the Basque LehendLzkari. 
While sorne parity activists within the PSOE celebrated the move ro pri­
maries, as a mechanism for internal democracy within parries, others soon 
discovered ro their dismay that primaries are very often an exclusively male 
business. Most of the people who compete in primaries and win them are 
meno Women tend not to run in primaries and those who dare to compete are 
usually not e1ected. There are several reasons for this lack of success, among 
them, women often lack the backing of important sectors of the party or 
women are much less known by PSOE members in their districts than male 
candidates with whom they compete. In the interviews conducted for this 
chapter no parity activist was openly against primaries, since this position is 
taboo within many sectors of the PSOE. Nonetheless, all of them confessed 
H 	 Winning positions in a given electoral disuict were de/ined as the positions that the PSOE had 
won in the earlier local, regional, and European elections (Carmen Martínez-Ten, interview). 
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that they had not foreseen the short-term detrimental consequences of pri­
maries for the representation of women. AH of them also declared that other 
things being equal, quotas would be less effective if primaries continue to be 
held than in the absence of primaries. 
In part to avoid such difficult internal politics, less than two months af­
ter being e1ected Secretary for Women's Participation of the PSOE Micaela 
Navarro announced her goal of reforming the electorallaw to force all po­
litical parties to include a minimum percentage of women in their lists (El 
País, August 8, I997)· After what turned out to be a premature announce­
ment of a PSOE-sponsored bill to establish a compulsory 40 % quota, the 
male leadership backed down. Supporters of such a bill mobilized within 
the party, but could not carry the day. The General-Secretary of the PSOE, 
Joaquín Almunia, and the candidate for prime minister in the next general 
election, José Borrell, both agreed that there was a risk that the reform could 
be struck down by the Constitutional Court (El País, December 27, I998). 
Thus, convincing the PSOE to move on changing the law proved impossible, 
despite the expressed support from other left-wing parties. The idea has been 
revived, however, and is included in the party's platform for the next election 
(Patrocinio de las Heras, communication). 
The Spanish parity movement also differs from the French in that it re­
tains explicit policy goals. Sorne documents do represent gender parity as an 
end in itself, as a matter of justice. u Parity activists picture themselves as 
foHowers of the first suffragists, who fought for the right to vote, while 
they are fighting for the right of women to be elected. Nevertheless, in 
the same documents and in the interviews conductedfor this study, gen­
" der parity is "a150 c1aimed because activists also maintain a social agenda. 
The argument goes like this. If women and men were equally represented in 
the political arena, policy outcomes would be different and more positive. 
Policy outcomes would better meet the particular needs of women. Poli­
cies would be elaborated in a more consensual way. Public measures would 
include the interests not only of women but also of other, less-privileged 
groups. 
Nor is achieving more women in elected office the principal aim of the 

Spanish parity movement. Ir is one among other components of a broader 

feminist agenda. Equal sharing of family responsibilities is another goal al­

most always present in parity documents. The argument is that the distinction 

between the private and the public is fictitious since the personal is political. 

H 	 Since there are no "founding documents" in the parity movement in Spain, we use as the 
main parity documents /ive articles on the topic published in El País by Cristina Alberdi, 
Minister ofSocial Issues, 1993-6 (1998); Inés Alberdi, /irst Director of the Women 's Institute, 
819 3-8 (1994); Carlota Bustelo (1992) (all three are Ceminist PSOE activists); Enriqueta 
Chicano (1999) (President oC the Federation of Progressive Women); and María Ángeles 
Ruíz-TagJe (1999) (President oC the Spanish Association to SuPPOrt the European Women 's 
Lobby ). 
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Responsibilities should be shared: Political decision making should not be 
the monopoly of men, as family and caring responsibilities should not be 
the monopoly of women. Spanish parity documents and the women inter­
viewed for this chapter also referred to the need to develop care services 
in the welfare sta te, to help women combine their professional and family 
responsibilities. 
In all these regards, the Spanish movement is still promoting the social 
rights of citizenship. lndeed, parity activists often c1aim to defend a "new so­
cial contract" between men and women, with three dimensions: equal access 
ro political decision making; equal right to paid employment; and equal shar­
ing of caring responsibilities. 23 While political rights come to the fore in inter­
party debate, social matters still remain a visible part of the feminist agenda. 
CONCLUSION 
The first section of this chapter suggested that the reconfiguration of the 
state has had three consequences for patterns of mobilization of the women's 
movement. Structural changes will make multilevel politics more common. 
Changing relationships between state and civil society and shifting discourses 
about the role of the state will blur traditional left-right distinctions, en­
hancing cross-party actions and giving political rights precedence over social 
rights. Our analysis reveals that these changes in patterns of mobilization can 
be observed in both France and Spain, but more consistently in the former 
than the latter, in large part beca use the internal party scene remains, as we 
have already noted, more differentiated in the Iberian case. 
Spainhas been a major contriburor to the .politics-of the EU, and the 
democratic-parity movement was actively present in developing and pro­
moting the European agenda as well as using the resources of the EU within 
Spain. Thus, multilevel politics are present as in France. However, the tradi­
tionalleft-right moorings of Spanish politics have not disappeared as much as 
they have in France. Cross-partisanship is not the norm. Right-wing parties 
scorn the PSOE's and other leftist parties' enthusiasm for quotas, although 
they are nominating women. The left uses the language of parity when call­
ing for quotas, while the PP has coined another expression. lt speaks of 
"equilibrated representation" (representación equilibrada) (Rosario Barrios, 
interview). Moreover, the language of social rights has not been abandoned; 
incre~sed participation by women is sought in order to achieve a broader 
agenda rather than simply ro achieve gender justice. There is a left discourse, 
coming from both the PSOE and its leftist competitors, defending the welfare 
state (albeit a retrenched one .. . ) while the right displays more interest in 
shifting responsibility from the state via downloading. Claims for increased 
representation of women track this distinction; the democratic-parity move­
ment is confined to the left. 
23 One mighr nore rhar rhe issue of sexualiry is complerely absenr from rhis agenda. 
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The French case shows all three patterns reflecting the effects of state re­
o configuration on the French women's movement. From the beginning, mul­
tilevel action was key, and is likely to remain so. Secondly, since r99 2 the 
French parity movement has been decidedly and consistently cross-partisan. 
This is in sharp contrast to other parts of the women's movement, such as the 
National Assizes, that traced the more traditionalleft-right divide. Thirdly, 
the parity movement has beco me the acceptable, albeit controversial, face of 
the women's movement, gaining support from politicians and having at least 
one version of its c1aim recognized via constitutional reformo lts agenda of 
ignoring differences in policy content and focusing only on the gender of can­
didates has gained favor from politicians across a wide political spectrum. 
Therefore, domestic politics influence the ways in which the movement for 
women's representation is actually inscribed in politics. The left-right divide 
continues to characterize Spanish politics in general, and the democratic­
parity movement, in contrast ro that of France, incorporates a policy agenda 
into its c1aims for better access for women to elected office. The defenders 
of the social agenda have not been sidelined. 
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